missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (CA8 1986). Again hesitating to impose a tax increase itself, the court continued its injunction against the Proposition C rollback to enable KCMSD to raise an additional $6.5 million. It makes no difference that the KCMSD stands "ready, willing, and . There are strong arguments against the validity of such a plan. This Court reversed, observing that the statute relied on by the city was passed after the bonds were issued and holding that because the city had ample authority to levy taxes to pay its bonds when they were issued, the statute impaired the contractual entitlements of the bondholders, contrary to Art. We granted certiorari to consider the State of Missouri's argument that the District Court lacked the power to raise local property taxes. Missouri argued that these orders went beyond the court's authority. Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. The appellate court affirmed the order with some modifications. 469 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Missouri_v._Jenkins&oldid=1063285610, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, United States school desegregation case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. The function of hiring and supervising a staff for what is essentially a political function has other complications. The term `suggest' was deliberately chosen to make it clear that a party's sole entitlement is to direct the attention of the court to the desirability of in banc consideration. Fed. This argument was rejected as early as Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, supra. -259 (1953). Footnote 18 The court again faced the problem of funding, for KCMSD's efforts to persuade the voters to approve a tax increase had failed, as had its efforts to seek funds from the Kansas City Council and the state legislature. Team Assignment (Teams DH): Please write a short memorandum (3-5 pages) considering whether the Supreme Court's decision in the two Missouri v. Jenkins cases are consistent or inconsistent. If we had accepted the State's broader, foundational question going to the magnet school concept, we could also have made an informed decision on whether that element of the District Court's remedial scheme was within the limits of the Court's equitable discretion in response to the constitutional . Beginning with the landmark Supreme Court cas, A federal judge in Arkansas in February 2007 issued a ruling that released the Little Rock School District from federal supervision related to desegr, Swann V Charlotte-mecklenburg County Board Of Education, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Importantly, the District Court did not order the State to bus children from other school districts because the court did not find any interdistrict segregation violations. 495 U. S. 53. Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One. Unless the State's petition was filed within 90 days of the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, we must dismiss the petition. U.S. 33, 46] [495 As was said in another context, "[t]he very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a . million in capital improvement bonds. U.S. 33, 63] See App. The court concluded, however, that several provisions of Missouri law would prevent KCMSD from being able to pay its share of the obligation. The District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the court order for the State to fund those measures. Such a plan as a practical matter raises many of the concerns involved in interdistrict desegregation remedies. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. Missouri appealed, arguing that the district courts orders exceeded its remedial authority. 153a. Some essential litigation history is necessary for a full understanding of what is at stake here and what will be wrought if the implications of all the Court's statements are followed to the full extent. Id., at 103a. 215 The Supreme Court ruled that while direct imposition of taxes is indeed beyond judicial authority, the district court could order the school district to levy the same tax: "Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of these institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those themselves who have created the problem." The court issued an order detailing a desegregation remedy and the financing necessary to implement it. to Pet. Nor did the Court of Appeals issue an order extending the time for the issuance of the mandate, as it may do under Rule 41(a). . The case before us represents the first in which a lower federal court has in fact upheld taxation to fund a remedial decree. Programs such as a "performing arts middle school," id., at 118a, a "technical magnet high school" that "will offer programs ranging from heating and air conditioning to cosmetology to robotics," id., at 75a, were approved. Although that court believed that it had no alternative to imposing the tax itself, it, in. Id., at 266. Leggett v. Liddell, (1963); Western Pacific Railroad Case, 298 855 F.2d 1295, Argued January 11, 1995-Decided June 12, 1995*. This is not an accurate description. Id., at 145a-146a (emphasis in original). Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems. 9th Circuit. In Heine, the Court held that it had no equitable power to impose a tax in order to prevent the plaintiff's right from going without a remedy. Compare Tr. The method of taxation endorsed by today's dicta suffers the same flaw, for a district court order that overrides the citizens' state-law protection against taxation without referendum approval can in no sense provide representational due process. [495 The Court of Appeals reasoned that permitting the school board to set the levy itself would minimize disruption of state laws and processes and would ensure maximum consideration of the views of state and local officials. Id., at 684, 685. Stat. 15 (emphasis added). (1879), held that mandamus would not lie to force a local government to levy taxes in excess of the limits contained in a statute in effect at the time the county incurred its bonded indebtedness, for the explicit limitation on the taxing power became part of the contract, the bondholders had notice of the limitation and were deemed to have consented to it, and hence no contractual remedy was unconstitutionally impaired by observing [BAD TEXT] he statute. The State filed a petition for certiorari within 90 days of the October 14, 1988, order, which was granted, limited to the question of the property tax increase. Rather, as a prerequisite to considering a taxation order, I would require a finding that that any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of discretion. . This Court has never approved a remedy of the type adopted by the District Court. U.S. 472, 501 U.S. 373, 385 The Missouri Constitution limits local property taxes to $1.25 per $100 of assessed valuation unless a majority of the voters in the district approve a higher levy, up to $3.25 per $100; the levy may be raised above $3.25 per $100 only if two-thirds of the voters agree. Apr 18, 1990. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 515, List of United States Supreme Court cases, Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume, List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court, "Money And School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City Desegregation Experiment", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". The District Court's school desegregation orders, which required the State of Missouri to fund across-the-board salary increases and to continue to fund remedial education programs, went beyond the court's remedial authority. this case, the State styled its filing as a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." In this 18-year-old school desegregation litigation, see, e. g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, Missouri challenges the District Court's orders . U.S. 124, 161 App. U.S. 33, 61] First, does the Eleventh Amendment prohibit enhancement of a fee award against a State to . Had it regarded the State's papers as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc, without a petition for rehearing, it would have, as required by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(c) and 41(a), issued its mandate within 21 days of the entry of the panel's judgment or would have, under Rule 41(a), issued an order extending the time for the issuance of the mandate. Brief for Petitioner at 15-16. Id., at 233 (emphasis added). Later, on remand in 1993, the district court ordered the state to pay for salary increases for teaching and non-teaching personnel. for Cert. U.S. 265, 280 (1947). 10 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it required the District Court to modify its funding order and reversed insofar as it allowed the tax increase imposed by the District Court to stand. with suggestions for rehearing en banc" were denied. The description of the judicial power nowhere includes the word "tax" or anything that resembles it. The Eighth Circuit ordered the District Court to divide the cost equally between the State and KCMSD. The Court of Appeals may not on every occasion have observed the technicalities of Rules 35(c) and 41(a), but we cannot conclude from the respondents' submission that the Eighth Circuit has engaged in a systematic practice of ignoring those formalities. [495 Lastly, the order requiring the State to continue to fund the quality education programs also cannot be sustained. U.S. 33, 52] See, e. g., United States v. Buljubasic, 828 F.2d 426 (CA7 1987). U.S. 294, 300 See id., at 1299 ("[W]e modify [the order's] future operation to more closely comport with limitations upon our judicial authority"); id., at 1318 ("We . The Court of Appeals' judgment was entered on August 19, 1988. The Court viewed this attempt to employ the writ of mandamus as a ruse to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's bar against exercising federal jurisdiction over the State. Opinion Announcement - June 12, 1995. 1997). 1 We have emphasized that although the "remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, . 88-64 Argued February 21, 1989 Decided June 19, 1989 491 U.S. 274 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In this major school desegregation litigation in Kansas City, Missouri, in which various desegregation remedies were granted against the State of Missouri and other Date: July 25, 2021 To: Professor Jason DeVaux From: Victoria Y. Rosebeary Case: Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Facts: In an action under 42 U.S.C. The following are excerpts from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins. p. 58. of Oral Arg. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. Oral Argument - October 30, 1989; Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990 . On December 31, 1988, 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, Jackson County presented to this Court an application for extension of time in which to file a petition for certiorari. (1979) (whether a state agency "may be ordered actually to promulgate regulations having effect as a matter of state law may well be doubtful"). Missouri v. Jenkins. The correct measure is through the three-part analysis inFreeman. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Our cases throughout the years leave no doubt that taxation is not a judicial function. X, and principles of federal/state comity. able" to impose a tax not authorized by state law. [495 Benson and the LDF requested attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two. 489-502. App. "Missouri v. Jenkins." Oyez . With him on the briefs were William Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, James B. Deutsch, Deputy Attorney General, Michael J. U.S., at 291 is not a petition for rehearing within the meaning of this Rule." The goals of the plan were to attract nonminority students to the school district and to provide the minority students in the district an equivalent education to one absent the effects of segregation. Desegregation of schools involves ending intentional segregation, but does not mean that minority and nonminority students must attend the same schools. To the contrary, 1983 is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of a remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the District Court's equitable powers. The State appealed, challenging the scope of the desegregation remedy, the allocation of the cost between the State and KCMSD, and the tax increase. U.S. 358, 368 The District Court was candid to acknowledge that the "long term goal of this Court's remedial order is to make available to all KCMSD students educational opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the average Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school district." CV 09-06731 SS. However, the date of retrieval is often important. U.S. 33, 71] The District Court also required the defendants to encourage voluntary interdistrict transfer of students. Every Bundle includes the complete text from each of the titles below: PLUS: Hundreds of law school topic-related videos from [495 Supp., at 28, 31-33. v. Evans, . It determined that segregation had caused a systemwide reduction in student achievement in the city district's schools and ordered a wide range of remedial "quality education" programs for all students in the city district's schools. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 495 U. S. 45-50. , And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. Article III of the Constitution states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." This holding has no application to this case, for the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from imposing on the States the costs of securing prospective compliance with a desegregation order, Milliken v. Bradley, The Court of Appeals observed that the increases were designed to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district and by reversing "white flight" to the suburbs. 672 F. Supp. We said that such a remedy "could be construed as the direct imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal court." In such cases, of which Pink was one, "no . The Kansas City Desegregation Case. The Court of Appeals thus required that in the future, the District Court should not set the property tax rate itself but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. ] United States v. County of Macon, Instead, predominately black schools may instill pride in black students and their communities, allowing them to be as successful as nonminority students. Proceedings before the District Court continued during the appeal. ] The District Court also imposed a 1.5% surcharge on the state income tax levied within the KCMSD. "The Fourteenth Amendment . (1977), the District Court found this insufficient. Id., at 20a. (Thomas, J.) Only after this Court's Clerk informed Jackson County that its application for extension of time was untimely did the Court of Appeals amend its October 14 order nunc pro tunc to state that there were "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court" and that those "petitions for rehearing . U.S. 531, 541 The Court is unanimous in its holding, that the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming "the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (CA8 1988), must be reversed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on August 19, 1988. BRIEF HISTORY, FACTS, AND HOLDING OF JENKINS. 3. , we stated that the enforcement of a money judgment against the State did not violate principles of federalism because "[t]he District Court . (1881); United States v. New Orleans, Cf. 1485 (1984). 377 See Spallone v. United States, The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the initial order, but ordered the lower court to divide the remedy's cost equally between the entities. The notion of white flight does not justify the court going beyond its authority here. The suggestion that our limited grant of certiorari requires us to decide this case blinkered as to the actual remedy underlying it, ante, at 53, is ill founded. Ante, at 51. [495 [495 As the Court chooses to discuss the question of future taxation, however, I must state my respectful disagreement with its analysis and conclusions on this vital question. The modifications ordered by the Court of Appeals cannot be assailed as invalid under the Tenth Amendment. Accord, Applying County v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F.2d 1301, 1304 (CA5), cert. U.S., at 266 88-1150). Commissioners, 19 Wall. See United States v. New Orleans, The Court asserts that its understanding of Griffin follows from cases in which the Court upheld the use of mandamus to compel local officials to collect taxes that were authorized under state law in order to meet bond obligations. U.S. 336, 340 It is plain that the KCMSD had no such power under state law. North Carolina Bd. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. As Brown v. Board of Education, Cf. The District Court abused its discretion in imposing the tax increase, which contravened the principles of comity. runs from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing or the entry of a subsequent judgment. The State of Missouri and Kansas City students had been involved in an 18-year-long. 1, begins with the statement that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes. U.S. 265 Even were I willing to accept the Court's proposition that a federal court might in some extreme case authorize taxation, this case is not the one. is the sole organ for levying taxes." for Cert. It is undoubtedly desirable to have published rules of procedure giving parties fair warning of the treatment afforded petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc. The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. H. Bartow Farr . 495 U.S. 52-58. . Id., at 121a. As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. [ . This puts the conclusion before the premise. The prudence we have required in other areas touching on federal court intrusion in local government, see, e. g., Spallone v. United States, 469 Can a court create a segregation remedial plan which has a goal of attracting nonminority students into the district? Michael D. Gordon and Lawrence A. Poltrock filed a brief for respondent American Federation of Teachers, Local 691. U.S. 247, 258 Whether or not KCMSD student achievement levels are still "at or below national norms at many grade levels" clearly is not the appropriate test for deciding whether a previously segregated district has achieved partially unitary status. 291 (1987). However, the trust fund is allocated according to a formula that does not compensate KCMSD for the amount lost in property tax revenues, and the effect of Proposition C is to divert nearly half of the sales taxes collected in KCMSD to other parts of the State. A limited grant of certiorari is not a means by which the Court can pose for itself 1986) (en banc), cert. (Rehnquist, C.J.) Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III) United States Supreme Court 515 U.S. 70 (1995) Facts The Kansas City, Missouri, School District (the district) (plaintiff) and a group of students (plaintiff) sued Missouri (defendant) in 1977 for maintaining a segregated school system in violation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). I cannot agree, however, that we "stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals," ante, at 52. The suggestion that failure to approve judicial taxation here would leave constitutional rights unvindicated rests on a presumption that the District Court's remedy is the only possible cure for the constitutional violations it found. And the remedial orders grew more expensive as shortfalls in revenue became more severe. 23Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. No. U.S. 658, 695 U.S. 33, 70] U.S. 358 The KCMSD plan adopted by the court provided that "every senior high school, every middle school, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD will become magnet schools by the school year 1991-92." The very cases cited by the majority show that a federal court has no such authority. . The Court states that the Court of Appeals' discussion of future taxation was not dictum because although the Court of rights or confer new powers. 377 U.S. 218, 233 The District Court believed that it had no alternative to imposing a tax increase. 113a. The KCMSD had asked the court to order the state to advance it funds for its desegregation and operating expenses. [495 U.S. 1206 Footnote 16 (1881) (same). Finally, we will discuss recent litigation regarding the budget of the District of Columbia. Pet. Pp. Since then, the total cost of capital improvements ordered has soared to over $540 million. See ante, at 55-57. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Id., at 70a. The power to exact a higher rate of property tax remains with the people, a majority of whom must agree to empower the KCMSD to increase the levy up to $3.75 per $100, and two-thirds of whom must agree for the levy to go higher. Syllabus by the Court In an action under 42 U.S.C. County of Macon has little relevance to the present case, for KCMSD's obligation to fund the desegregation remedy arises from its operation of a segregated school system in violation of the Constitution, not from a contract between KCMSD and respondents. This assertion of judicial power in one of the most sensitive of policy areas, that involving taxation, begins a process that over time could threaten fundamental alteration of the form of government our Constitution embodies. This case clearly reveals a Court majority attempting to place parameters around what was once a relatively broad view of a federal courts ability to cure the ills of past racial discrimination. See Mo. of Treasury, Accepting the District Court's conclusion that state-law limitations prevented KCMSD from raising sufficient funds, it held that those limitations must fall to the Constitution's command and affirmed all of the District Court's actions taken to that point. Our Rule 13.4 now expressly incorporates this practice. It is the end of civil society. one regarded as a distinct unit because of a particular characteristic, The attempt to end the practice of separating children of different races into distinct public schools. He argued that as the State and KCMSD were jointly and severally liable for the cost of the desegregation remedy, the District Court should have allowed any amount that KCMSD was unable to pay to fall on the State rather than require the tax increase. may not be increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter approval as provided by this constitution." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment. [ of Equalization, The Eighth Circuit surely knows The Sixth Circuit, in a somewhat different context, has recognized the severe intrusion caused by federal court interference in state and local financing. of Estimate v. Morris, the legislature, even an administrative agency to which the legislature has delegated taxing authority, due process requires notice to the citizens to be taxed and some opportunity to be heard. Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. (1915). 493 App. Const., Art. But this broad suggestion does not follow from the holding in Von Hoffman. The State's argument that federal courts cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because that requires local governments to do more than exercise the power that is theirs has been rejected, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall.

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